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In this paper, I provide an overview of some of the issues 
surrounding the measurement of government performance, 
focusing on the case of the U.S. federal government.  After 
defining  government  performance  and  introducing  the 
challenge of measuring it, I examine how this challenge is 
being addressed at the federal level in the United States.  I 
argue that performance measurement is particularly difficult 
in  this  context  because  under  the  American  constitution, 
agencies  respond  to  multiple  principals,  in  particular  the 
president  and  Congress,  which  often  have  diverging 
preferences.    I  introduce  congressional  and  presidential 
performance  measurement  initiatives,  especially  the 
Government  Performance  and  Results  Act  including  its 
recent  reform,  the  Obama  administration‟s  high  priority 
performance  goals,  and  the  George  W.  Bush 
administration‟s  Program  Assessment  Rating  Tool.    I 
conclude with a brief review of potential undesired agency 
response to targets (such as the high priority performance 
goals), drawing on Christopher Hood‟s research on gaming.   
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Rezumat 
În această lucrare voi prezenta o analiză a unor elemente conexe 
măsurării  perfomanței  guvernului,  vizând  situația  guvernului 
federal  din  SUA.  După  definirea  perfomanței  guvernului  și 
prezentarea provocărilor în măsurarea acestuia, voi examina cum 
această provocare este abordată la nivelul federal în Statele Unite. 
Argumentez că măsurarea performanței este dificilă în contextul 
constituției americane, agențiile fiind răspunzătoare în fața unor 
decidenți diferiți, precum Președintele și Congresul, care au de 
multe  ori  preferințe  divergente.  Voi  prezenta  inițiativele  din 
Congres și prezidențiale de măsurare ale performanței, în special 
Legea Rezultatelor și Performanțelor Guvernamentale, incluzând 
reformle recente, obiectivele de performanță de importanță ridicată 
ale administrației Obama și Instrumentul de Clasificare a Evaluării 
Programelor  al  administraței  Bush.  Voi  încheia  cu  o  scurtă 
prezentare  a  potențialei  reacții a  agenției  față  de  ținte  (precum 
obiectivele  de  performanță  de  prioritate  ridicată),  pe  baza  unei 
cercetări a jocului, realizată de Christopher Hood. 
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For some people, government performance is an oxymoron.  It clearly does not have to be one though.  
What we can say with certainty is that government performance is a complex concept.  The common 
denominator  of  a  number  of  typically  used  definitions  is  that  government  performance  is 
multidimensional (for a more detailed discussion, see Brewer and Selden, 2000, 688-689).  For the 
purposes of this paper, I define government performance as the degree to which a government agency 
or program achieves the goals assigned to it through the democratic process.  This definition is a 
narrowed-down variation of Rainey and Steinbauer‟s (1999) definition of agency effectiveness: “The 
agency  performs  well  in  discharging  the  administrative  and  operational  functions  pursuant  to  the 
mission. It achieves the mission as conceived by the organization and its stakeholders, or pursues 
achievement of it in an evidently successful way” (13).  Government performance is a complex concept 
because  not  only  does  it  always  have  more  than  one  dimension  but  citizens  disagree  about  the 
importance of the different dimensions.  Worse, the different dimensions of performance may not even 
be correlated (for a related discussion, see Meyer, 2002, pp. 2-3).  Boyne‟s (2002) breakdown of the 
different  dimensions  of  local  government  performance  is  helpful  as  a  general  framework  for 
understanding the concept.  The fifteen dimensions of performance he enumerates clearly show the 
breadth of government performance: quantity of outputs, quality of outputs, cost per unit of output, 
formal  effectiveness,  impact,  equity,  cost  per  unit  of  formal  effectiveness/impact/equity,  consumer 
satisfaction, citizen satisfaction, staff satisfaction, cost per unit of consumer/citizen/staff satisfaction, 
probity,  participation,  accountability,  and  cost  per  unit  of  probity/participation/accountability  (Boyne 
2002, 19).  It is easy to construct examples where some of these dimensions are negatively correlated 
or uncorrelated.   
One important observation about government performance in all contexts is that its measurement is 
always imperfect.  The city of Bristol in southern England provides a good example.  As part of a central 
government mandate, Bristol, just like all other primary local governments, had been collecting random 
sample survey data on citizen satisfaction every three years.  In the 2003 round of this survey, 64 per 
cent of respondents stated that they were very or fairly satisfied with the services provided by their local 
government.  In the 2006 round, this figure dropped to a rather shocking 35 per cent.  Had Bristol turned 
into a miserable failure in the meantime?  Other data on Bristol‟s performance over this period do not 
suggest that there was a dramatic deterioration in its services.  Rather, the most plausible explanation is 
a seemingly minor decision by Bristol Council: to switch from weekly to biweekly trash collection.  The 
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property for another week, in the warmest month of the year---was most unfortunate: It took place one 
month before the 2006 citizen satisfaction survey (Boyne et al. 2009; interview by the author and Oliver 
James with Bristol City Council performance officers on June 13, 2008).  Citizen satisfaction can be 
even trickier as a measure since increases in performance may not match up to increased citizen 
expectations, such that an increase on a fairly clear measure of performance (such as the speed with 
which planning applications are processed) may be accompanied by a drop rather than by a rise in 
citizen satisfaction (James, 2009).   
2. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN THE U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
 While the measurement of government performance is far from easy at the local level, at the federal 
level in the United States the challenge takes on a whole other dimension.  The peculiar constitutional 
context of the United States leads to further disagreement about what is to be measured, and how.  
Whereas in most European countries, a clear chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000, 266) extends from the 
electorate to parliament to the government to agencies, in the United States federal government, most 
agencies have more than one master.  While they are formally under the ultimate command of the 
elected  president,  they  are  also  under  close  scrutiny  by  the  separately  elected  House  of 
Representatives  and  the  Senate,  and  especially  the  relevant  subcommittees  and  appropriations 
committees in these two branches (Seidman, 1998).  The incentives of agencies are generally in favor 
of closer alignment with Congress as opposed to the president.  While a few scholars, particularly David 
Rosenbloom  consider  the  president  to  essentially  be  an  agent  of  Congress  (Rosenbloom,  2000), 
presidents themselves and their electorates tend not to think or act in this fashion.  Instead, they will do 
whatever is in their power to maintain and enhance their control over federal agencies.  The result is an 
ongoing  tug-of-war  between president  and  Congress  over  the  direction  that  federal  agencies  take 
(Macey, 1991; Whitford, 2005).  In this tug-of-war, the major „weapons‟ of Congress and its relevant 
committees  and  subcommittees  are  administrative  rules  (McCubbins,  Noll  and  Weingast,  1989), 
informal  signals sent  to  agencies  including  the  threat  of  oversight  (Seidman,  1998), incentives  for 
interest  groups  to  monitor  agencies  (McCubbins  and  Schwartz,  1984),  and  appropriations  with 
conditions  attached  (Aldrich  and  Rohde,  2000;  Copeland,  2008;  Seidman,  1998).    The  president 
counters with appointments of agency heads (Epstein and O‟Halloran, 1999; Wood and Waterman, 
1991), signals sent  to  agencies in  the  presidential  budget  requests  (Wood  and  Waterman,  1991), 
centralized control over all regulations issued by agencies in the Office of Management and Budget 
(Kagan, 2001; Seidman, 1998), and administrative reorganization, where feasible (Seidman, 1998).  
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(Macey, 1991), which are of minor relevance to the topic of the present paper, however.  Moe and 
Caldwell (1994) provide an institutional explanation for this never-ending tug-of-war between Congress 
and  president,  and  the  complex  nature  of  the  American  federal  bureaucracy  that  results  from  it.  
Members of Congress tend to focus on specific geographic and sectoral constituencies.  They tend to 
be  most  interested  in  systems  that  make  agencies  (even)  more  responsive  to  the  particular 
subcommittees overseeing them.  On the other hand, presidents tend to be interested in systems that 
allow them to centrally control and coordinate across agencies.  One example of th e latter is the 
Reagan administration‟s successful usage of the Carter administration‟s Paperwork Reduction Act to 
centralize control over all federal rule-making in the president‟s Office of Management and Budget 
(Seidman, 1998, 105-106).  This system has served them well, and all presidents after Reagan have 
continued to use it.   
Performance  measurement  in  the  U.S.  federal  government  may  be  understood  partly  as  a  small 
component of the armories of Congress and the president in their respective attempts to steer agencies 
in the directions they desire.   
The major weapon of Congress in this area has been the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA).  In its original form, it went into effect in 1993.  There were three main aspects to the original 
GPRA, but they all revolved around the basic idea of federal agencies becoming more oriented towards 
results as opposed to process.  First, federal agencies were required to develop a five-year strategic 
plan with mission statements and long term results-oriented goals for each of their major functions.  
Second, agencies were also required to develop annual performance plans that included performance 
goals, a description of how these goals would be met, and a method for measuring and evaluating these 
goals.  Finally, agencies were required to prepare annual performance reports comparing actual results 
with the annual performance goals to assess success or failure in meeting targets.  GPRA helped 
Congress to hold agencies accountable not only for processes but also results.  The measurements 
prescribed by this legislation spurred a host of activity in federal performance measurement.   
Seventeen years after the passage of the original GPRA, Congress passed the GPRA Modernization 
Act  of  2010  (GPRAMA),  and  President  Obama  signed it into  law  on January  4,  2011.    The new 
legislation takes into account the accumulated experience with the original GPRA.  The major change 
lies in the greater integration of strategic plans, programs, and performance indicators in GPRAMA.  
The U.S. Government Accountability Office, Congress‟s watchdog agency, has identified five areas in 
which GPRAMA could address problem areas in government administration.  First, GPRAMA could 
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better  address  existing  weaknesses  in  major  management  functions.    Third,  it  could  ensure  that 
performance information is both useful and used in decision making processes.  Fourth, it could achieve 
leadership commitment and accountability for results.  Fifth, it could enhance Congress‟s engagement 
in identifying management and performance issues by increasing the requirements for agencies to 
consult with Congress (Dodaro, 2011).  This last area is most pertinent to the thesis that GPRA and 
GPRAMA are helpful weapons in the congressional arsenal.   
One of the most interesting changes brought by GPRAMA is that now, agencies‟ strategic plans are 
aligned with presidential terms rather than being written for a five-year period, as under the original 
GPRA.  At the same time, the law strengthens congressional control by encouraging agencies to closely 
consult with Congress in the development of their strategic plans and performance goals.  Overall, the 
act  enhances  the  control  of both  elected  branches  in  the  area  of  performance management  (see 
Kamensky, 2011).   
GPRAMA  also  requires  agencies  to  provide  more  information  by  revising  the  annual  agency 
performance plan requirement.  The performance plans must now include the strategies and resources 
needed  to achieve the performance goals, and the plans must now extend for two years, rather than 
the previous one year periods.  Not only are agencies required to specify clearly defined milestones, 
policies, regulations, and other activities necessary for achieving the performance goals, but they are 
also required to post their performance plan on the agency website (Kamensky, 2011).   
Agencies have to submit their annual performance reports, which show how far along in achieving their 
performance plans they are, 150 days after the close of the fiscal year.  The legislation encourages 
them to submit more frequent reports.  GPRAMA brings about a major change to the performance 
reporting  process  by  adding  a  “review  and  respond”  requirement:  Now,  the  president‟s  Office  of 
Management and Budget has to judge whether an agency is substantially achieving its performance 
goals.  If the Office of Management and Budget determines that goals have not been met, they will 
submit a report to the head of the agency in question, the relevant congressional committees, and to the 
Government Accountability Office, the congressional watchdog agency.  GPRAMA further stipulates a 
three-year plan for agencies that continue to fall short of their performance goals, with the reporting 
requirements becoming increasingly intrusive as the failure continues (Kamensky, 2011).   
Perhaps the most interesting innovation of GPRAMA is that it requires the Director of the presidential 
Office of Management of Budget to work with agencies to develop federal government priority goals, 
which are policy goals that cut across agency boundaries (discussed further below).  To promote the 
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goals  align  with  the  federal  priority  goals,  and  to  prioritize  these.    The  Director  of  the  Office  of 
Management of Budget will review the progress achieved toward these priority goals on a quarterly 
basis (Kamensky, 2011).  This innovation means that GPRAMA enhances presidential control just as it 
enhances congressional control.  It is important to note that GPRAMA was passed on a largely partisan 
basis towards the end of a period of Democratic Party control of both houses of Congress during the 
first part of Barack Obama‟s presidency (see House Republican Conference, 2010).  This could mean 
that now, and in the future, when the preferences of Congress and its subcommittees once again 
diverge significantly from those of the president, a tension will develop between the congressional 
aspects of GPRAMA and the presidential aspects, in particular the high priority performance goals.   
The Obama administration‟s high priority performance goals were introduced in the presidential budget 
request for fiscal year 2011 (October 1, 2010-September 30, 2011).  Agency heads chose goals that 
they anticipated being able to achieve within two years and that did not require additional resources or 
legislative action.  For example, the Social Security Administration specified four priority goals.  The first 
is to increase the proportion of benefits applications filed online to 50 percent by 2012.  The second is to 
lower the backlog in the processing of disability benefit claims such as to ensure that people filing a 
severely disabling conditions claim receive an initial decision within 20 days of filing their application.  
The third is to increase several overall public satisfaction metrics.  The fourth is to minimize improper 
payments and strengthen efforts to protect program dollars from waste, fraud, and abuse (White House, 
2011).  Only the first two goals are clearly operational, i.e. it will be unambiguously clear at their stated 
end time whether or not they have been achieved (Wilson, 1989, 34).   
Another  example  is  the  Department  of  Defense,  which  has  identified  eight  categories  of  goals  in 
everything from energy efficiencies to their acquisition process.  The priority goals include producing or 
procuring renewable energy equal to 10 percent of the Department of Defense‟s annual electric energy 
usage, reforming the Personnel Security Clearance Process such that the fastest 90 percent of initial 
top  secret  and  secret  personnel  security  clearance  cases  are  adjudicated  within  20  days,  and 
decreasing  the  Defense  Department‟s  reliance  on  contract  services  in  acquisition  functions  by 
increasing the in-house workforce by 4765 authorizations for personnel (White House, 2011).   
In a final example, among the Department of Housing and Urban Development‟s priority goals is a 
collaborative effort with the Department of Veteran Affairs to reduce the number of homeless veterans 
to 59,000 in June 2012 (White House, 2011).   
Before High Priority Performance Goals, the previous performance initiative from the executive side was 
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enhancing the performance reporting for federal programs.  Just as the current priority performance 
goals are overseen by the president‟s Office of Management and Budget, it also directed the PART 
program.    Beginning  in  2002,  Office  of  Management  and  Budget  staff  reviewed scores  of  federal 
programs every year, up to and including 2008.  The PART was a questionnaire with various items on 
each of four dimensions: (i) program purpose and design, (ii) planning, (iii) management, and (iv) 
results.  Office of Management and Budget grading teams filled in answers to these questions in 
accordance  with  responses  and  evidence  provided  by  program  officials  from  the  various  federal 
agencies.    The  answers  to  the  questions  on  each  of  the  four  dimensions  were  aggregated  into 
numerical  scores  as  well  as  an  overall  program  rating,  which  was  either  an  overall  program 
performance evaluation (“effective,” “moderately effective,” “adequate,” “ineffective”) or an indication 
that the program did not provide the Office of Management and Budget with enough evidence for it to 
make a well-substantiated evaluation of the results of the program (“results not demonstrated”).  The 
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  published  the  aggregated  PART  scores  for  each  of  the  four 
dimensions and the overall PART program rating as part of the presidential budget requests during the 
years of PART‟s existence.  The overall ratings were also disseminated to the public  through the 
website www.expectmore.gov.  The Obama administration terminated PART in 2010.   
3. INHERENT PROBLEMS IN THE USAGE OF PERFORMANCE TARGETS 
At the end of this brief overview of performance measurement in the American federal government, it is 
worth taking a step back to consider some problems inherent in the usage of performance targets, such 
as the ones the Obama administration is now using and the British government has been using for over 
a decade.  Drawing on academic research on the Soviet Union‟s usage of performance targets, Hood 
(2006) and Bevan and Hood (2006) carefully dissect the gaming behaviors that are virtually inevitable if 
performance targets are imposed.  Among these behaviors, Hood (2006) distinguishes between ratchet, 
threshold, and output distortion effects.   
Ratchet effects can occur whenever next year‟s performance targets are set as increments of this year‟s 
performance.  If managers and employees know this process, they are likely to underachieve this year, 
so that next year‟s performance target, which will be an increase on this year‟s actual achievement, will 
not be challenging to them.  It would be conceivable that a target of 50 percent online applications for 
Social Security benefits could be perceived as only the beginning of a series of successively more 
ambitious targets.  If that were the case, while 60 percent might be in reach, the agency would limit its  








PETROVSKY Nicolai  
MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES AND PROGRAMS IN THE USA: AN 




























































































































































































































































































































































































Threshold effects can occur when uniform performance targets are applied to a number of agencies or 
divisions, where some perform higher at the outset than others.  The divisions performing highly from 
the outset have no incentive to improve since they already perform beyond the threshold specified by 
the target.  Indeed, they may reduce their efforts and objectively fall in their performance, to the exact 
level of the target.  Looking at the aforementioned examples of high priority performance goals, it would 
be conceivable that some security clearances in the Department of Defense and some Social Security 
disability benefit claims may now take longer than previously---e.g. some that could be done in 10 days 
might now take close to 20---as these agencies might shift resources in order to achieve the high priority 
performance goal of having security clearances and disability benefit claims completed within 20 days.   
Output distortion effects are present whenever managers and employees focus on the letter of a 
performance target instead of its spirit.  There appears to be potential for such an effect in the goal to 
reduce  the  number  of  homeless  veterans  to  59,000.    The  Department  of  Housing  and  Urban 
Development and the Department of Veteran Affairs might end up finding some solution that strictly 
fulfills the target by the deadline but fails to offer a longer-term perspective to the veterans affect, such 
that the number of homeless or dependent veterans might not decrease in a sustained manner.   
I would like to stress that the examples of potential gaming discussed here are purely hypothetical, and 
that it is likely that Office of Management and Budget officials will take them into account in collecting 
information about agency progress toward these targets.  These hypothetical examples do, however, 
serve  the  purpose  of  highlighting  that  performance  management  using  targets  is  a  challenging 
endeavor.  It may be the case that it works for bringing agencies and programs up to some standard of 
performance, but that they are incapable of inducing excellence, as the dysfunctional side-effects of 
performance measurement become more important at higher baseline levels of performance.  Future 
work will have to examine this hypothesis. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Regardless of future revisions to the recently reformed GPRA, or perhaps it being moved to the sideline 
by  new  initiatives,  performance  measurement  and  management  will  remain  a  salient  topic  at  the 
American federal level.  One reason is that critical citizens are likely to provide a continued impetus for 
efforts to improve the performance of government agencies and programs.  In addition, a government 
that continues to raise less than 60 percent of its expenditures in taxes (United States Department of 
the Treasury Financial Management Service, 2011) may even find performance information to be one 
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new  web  portal  to  make  a  number  of  metrics  accessible  to  a  broader  public: 
http://www.performance.gov/.  It will remain to be see whether this leads to greater citizen involvement 
in appraising federal agency performance.   
In spite of the virtually assured continued interest in performance measurement and management at the 
federal level in the United States, the major caveat is that it is, and will remain, of secondary importance 
in shaping the directions of federal agencies and programs compared to the tug-of-war between the 
president and the balance of interests in Congress. 
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